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Entry order analysis often shows that early eritrrints to an itidustry or technical subfield  of 
an industr?, outperform laggards. Some studiess,  though, hme  found thrit late entrrints prervil. 
This paper tests  did-clock  hypotheses  of entry  order  effects on  perfortilance,  riieasitred 
both as market share and survival.  One entry  clock  records the entry of  all  entrctrits to a 
new technical subfield  within (in industry, while a second clock  records the entry of’ industry 
incumbents. Relative  to  the cippropriate  clock. early entrmit.s are predicted  to oritperforin 
Irtggards,  but  when entry  is inemired on  only one clock, the estiriiuterl influences riiny be 
inaccurate.  Error  will be particularly likely  if  a study contriitis  {t  surr,ivor  bias.  The study. 
which finds entry  timing  tmde-ofjy between  rmirket  share and survird, is  gerierrilizirble to 
cmes in which N plriisible set of  conditions  is found. 
As an industry evolves, industry incumbents and 
newcomers must decide whether to manufacture 
products within new technical areas early, to wait 
until other firms have tested the new goods and 
the markets for them (Nelson and Winter,  1982; 
MacMillan,  1985), or  never  to  introduce  them. 
Early  entry  has  risks-a  firm  may  invest  in 
idiosyncratic assets that turn out to be valueless 
because the new products do not work or no one 
wants  to  buy  them.  (Williamson,  1975,  1988; 
Aaker  and  Day,  1986),  or  late  entrants  may 
incorporate  early  research  at  lower  cost 
(Mansfield, Schwartz, and Wagner,  1981). But if 
a firm waits for technical and market uncertainties 
to subside,  it  may  be  frozen  out  of  a profitable 
market by  participants that took the risk of  early 
entry (Lieberman  and Montgomery,  1988). So is 
it better to be early or late, or never to enter at 
all? 
The relative  advantages and  disadvantages  of 
early entry will vary across industries and among 
types  of  firms  within  an  industry.  This  paper 
investigates entry timing effects on market share 
and  survival  performance  in  an  industry  in 
which  a firm’s specialized  assets  in one product 
generation  retain  their  value  in  the next.  Such 
cases  are  likely  to  occur  when  core  products 
change  significantly  but  users  for  the  products 
remain largely the same from one set of  products 
to the next, so that the value of specialized assets 
such as service systems and reputations does not 
wither. 
The  paper  argues  that  incumbents  of  such 
industries  are  likely  to  possess  strong  sets  of 
assets required for the commercialization of  goods 
in a new technical subfield. As a consequence, the 
effects  of  being  early  or  late  will  vary  with 
the  type  of  entrant.  An  industry  newcomer’s 
performance  is  predicted  to  be  affected  by  its 
entry  order  relative  to  all  other  entrants.  An 
incumbent’s performance, however. will be affect- 
ed mainly by  its order of  entry relative  to other 
incumbents,  rather  than  by  its  overall  entry 
order.  The  study  tests  these  predictions  by 
examining  entry order  effects  on  market  share 
and  survival  in  five  technical  subfields  of  the 
American diagnostic imaging industry. 
Imaging techniques  allow health care workers 
to  obtain  pictures  of  physiological  structures 
within  the  body.  The  imaging  industry,  which 
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was created with the commercialization of  conven- 
tional x-ray and electrodiagnostic' equipment at 
the beginning of  the twentieth century, consisted 
of  about forty manufacturers in  the early  1950s. 
Since the  1950s more than 300 imaging industry 
incumbents  and  newcomers  have  entered  new 
technical  subfields  of  the  industry.  as  nuclear 
medical, ultrasonic, computed tomographic, mag- 
netic resonance, and digital radiographic products 
have  emerged.  Some  incumbents  introduced 
products early in the history of  the new subfields; 
others waited  many  years.  Newcomers,  mean- 
while,  were  the  earliest  entrants  to  the  new 
subfields and continue to enter 30  years later. 
Although  many major product  advances have 
taken  place  within  the  imaging  industry.  much 
of  the value of  an incumbent's specialized  assets 
has  been  retained  from  one  product  to  the 
next. For instance. difficult-to-replicate sales and 
service  systems,  incremental  R&D  capabilities, 
and  reputations  that  were  valuable  in  one era 
continued to be valuable in the next. The industry 
presents  a  common  mix  of  the  first-mover 
advantages and disadvantages listed by Lieberman 
and Montgomery  (1988). First, or early, movers 
do  not  acquire  significant  advantages  through 
product and process leadership or preemption of 
upstream assets, but may be able to create buyer 
switching  costs  if  their  products  are successful. 
Because  of  uncertainty  about  technical  and 
market development, however, early movers risk 
being locked into unfortunate choices. Moreover, 
because  technical development  is  not fully pro- 
prietary, late movers can learn from the technical 
mistakes of  earlier entrants, sometimes at lower 
cost. This paper examines the effects on  market 
share  and  survival  of  the  differences  in  entry 
order by  incumbents and newcomers in such an 
industry. 
This  paper  has  two  main  contributions.  By 
avoiding  the  survivor,  heterogeneous  entrant, 
and  multiple  industry  biases  found  in  many 
entry  order  studies,  the  study  improves  our 
understanding  of  entry  order  influences  on 
performance.  In addition, it  demonstrates that 
early  entry  timing  may  involve  a  trade-off 
between  market share and survival. 
' Electrodiagnostic instruments often are not  included in  the 
definition  of  diagnostic  imaging  equipment  (McKay.  1983. 
for  example).  They  are  included  because  several  of  the 
emerging imaging  technologies competed with  them. 
DOES ENTRY ORDER INFLUENCE 
PERFORMANCE? 
Several researchers have found that early entrants 
to  consumer  and  industrial  markets  gain  more 
market share or are more profitable than laggards 
(Bond and Lean, 1977; Whitten, 1979; Biggadike, 
1979;  Yip,  1982;  Robinson  and  Fornell,  1985; 
Urban  et  al.,  1986; Robinson,  1988; Lambkin, 
1988; Miller, Gartner, and Wilson, 1989). Other 
analysts,  though,  have  found  entry  order  to 
have opposite, mixed, or insignificant influences 
(Freeman, 1982; Spital,  1983; Friar, 1986; Van- 
honacker  and  Day,  1987).  Wherein  lies  the 
confusion? 
The single-clock confusion 
Some  of  the  conflict  in  the  analyses  of  entry 
timing  influences  arises  because  analysts  have 
used  a  single  clock  to  record  entry order. But 
an  industry  may  contain  more  than  one  set 
of  entry  order  incentives,  depending  on  the 
characteristics of  the entrants. When the multiple 
incentives are not identified, the empirical results 
may be  inaccurate. 
This paper shows that industry incumbents and 
industry  newcomers may be  subject to different 
entry  timing  incentives  and  effects on perform- 
ance when they enter new technical subfields of 
an  industry.  When  only  one  clock  is  used  to 
record  entry timing of  both industry  newcomers 
and incumbents, entry timing influences may be 
hidden.  By  measuring the influences of the dual 
clocks,  more  accurate  estimates  of  entry  order 
effects may be obtained. 
The distinction between incumbents and new- 
comers depends on the possession of complemen- 
tary assets, to which a new good is specialized, that 
retain their value from one product generation to 
the  next.  A  new  product  typically  requires  the 
support  of  complementary  goods  and  systems, 
such  as  key  components  and  development, 
manufacturing, distribution, and service systems 
(Phillips,  1966).  Specialized  complementary 
assets, which are supporting capabilities that must 
be tailored  to  a  good  in  order  to  successfully 
commercialize  it  (Teece,  1986),  frequently  are 
difficult or  costly  to replicate  quickly.  In  many 
cases of  product evolution the specialized support- 
ing assets held by  industry incumbents will retain 
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product,  and so provide competitive advantages 
because  of  the difficulty,  cost,  and  uncertainty 
of  imitation (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982). 
The effect  of  specialized  assets on the  entry 
timing  and  performance  of  firms which  possess 
them and firms which do not will  depend on the 
time it takes to replicate them, which will in turn 
be influenced  by  the ease and cost of  imitation. 
If  a  new  good  is  uniquely  specialized  to  a 
nonreplicable  asset  held  by  only  one  firm-a 
good  that  depends  on  a  strongly  patented 
component, for example-the  owner of  the asset 
will be  able to enter at any time  and dominate 
the market. It may, indeed, be the only entrant. 
The Polaroid Corporation and the Xerox Corpo- 
ration long had the instant camera and photocopier 
markets to themselves because of  strong patents. 
Most  products,  however,  eventually  can  be 
replicated  (Mansfield,  Schwartz,  and  Wagner, 
1981; Levin et al. 1988). Imagine such a case in 
which  some potential entrants possess  assets to 
which an emerging set of  products is specialized 
and others do not. In many cases the two classes 
of  entrants will  divide  into industry  incumbent 
and  industry  newcomer  classifications.  Suppose 
there  are  industry  newcomers  which  might 
introduce  the  new  products  without  benefit 
of  all  required  specialized  assets,  expecting 
eventually to replicate them or contract for their 
use. The incumbents can wait while those without 
the resources enter, at least until the replication 
process  nears  completion.  Indeed, such  inertia 
will  often  be  beneficial  (Hannan and  Freeman, 
1977, 1984), because the laggards will avoid some 
projects that do not successfully emerge from the 
technical  and  market  uncertainties  of  early 
development stages (Abernathy  and  Utterback, 
1978; Dosi,  1988). But when  newcomers  begin 
to build  their own sets of  specialized  assets the 
incumbents  will  have  to  follow  or  lose  their 
competitive  advantage.  And  once  some  incum- 
bents  begin  to  enter,  the  others  will  have  to 
follow or  be  locked  out by  the earlier entrants 
(Mitchell, 1989). 
Incumbents do not always possess advantages 
following  a  product  revolution.  Sometimes, 
instead,  they  face  significant  disadvantages, 
especially if their existing routines are not suited 
to the new environment, so that they try to solve 
new problems with inappropriate methods (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982). Such cases will  be particularly 
common if  a product  change leads to new  usage 
and new users, so that the complex links between 
the  incumbents  and  old  users  cannot  easily  be 
transferred to new opportunities. Eletromechanical 
calculator manufacturers, for instance, were able 
to  introduce  technically  successful  electronic 
calculators  but  did  not  understand  the  new 
markets  in  which  they  were  sold  and  so failed 
commercially (Majumdar, 1981). 
Often,  though,  key  assets  will  retain  their 
value.  This  will  be  particularly  common  when 
user bases do not change, so that an incumbent 
often  can  acquire  the  new  product  know-how 
and  dominate sales  after  introducing  the  new 
products,  even  if  it  is  not  the  first  entrant. 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers, for instance, often 
are able to dominate from one product generation 
to the next. 
In  such  cases,  industry  newcomers,  although 
usually possessing at least one specialized  capa- 
bility  (Alchian,  1982),  lack  the  breadth  of 
supporting capabilities possessed by  incumbents. 
They do not possess established reputations with 
users,  and  do not  have  large-scale  distribution 
and  service  systems  in  place.  In  addition, 
newcomers  often  lack  the  ability  to  carry  out 
effective  incremental  R&D, which  frequently 
depends on a detailed understanding of  product 
usage  and  relies  on strong links to users.  They 
will  be  at  a  competitive  disadvantage  relative 
to  industry  incumbents,  no  matter  when  the 
newcomers enter. 
Relative  to  other  newcomers,  however,  an 
early  entrant  does  have  potential  advantages 
because  it will  have  more  time  to build  sets of 
specialized  assets  before  the  entry  of  industry 
incumbents. If  its product  works,  the  firm  may 
be  able  to create  buyer  switching  costs  while 
there are few competitors. 
When  one set of  firms  possesses  difficult-to- 
imitate  specialized  assets that are valuable  in a 
new product generation, therefore, there are two 
entry clocks.  One clock  records  all entries and 
influences firms that enter without  benefit  of  a 
strong set of  specialized assets. The second clock 
records the entry of  entrants that do possess the 
assets. The length of gap between the clocks will 
depend on the  speed with  which  an  entrant  in 
the first class could replicate the supporting assets 
held  by  a  potential  entrant  in  the  second.  In 
many cases the two clocks will  reflect influences 
on the performance of  industry incumbents and 
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However, there are many types of performance, 
some of  which  may  involve  trade-offs.  Market 
share  and  length  of  participation,  for  instance, 
may  have  different  relationships  with  entry 
timing.  Because  of  early  uncertainty,  an  early 
entrant faces the  risk  of  being  knocked  out of 
the market through  unlucky technical or market 
choices.  A  later  entrant may  be  better able  to 
pick  a  successful  technical  and  market  niche, 
although  often with  lower market  share  than  if 
it had moved earlier, so that it may face an entry 
timing trade-off  between  high market share and 
longer survival. 
Hypotheses 
Several  testable  hypotheses  follow  from  the 
dual-clock  argument,  concerning  performance 
in  industries  in  which  technical  and  market 
development  is  uncertain.  new  products  are 
imitable, incumbents possess broad sets of special- 
ized supporting assets that cannot  be  replicated 
immediately, and some industry newcomers have 
the  potential  to  replicate  the  assets.  These 
conditions,  while  not  fully  general,  are  broad 
and  plausible.  Each  hypothesis,  which  holds 
other influences  constant,  is  stated  in  terms  of 
performance  generally,  but  will  be  tested  for 
both  market share and survival. 
Hypothesis la-the first-clock prediction (a). 
The  earlier  an  industry  newcomer  enters  u 
technical  subfield  relative  to  all  participants, 
the better its performance in the subfield. 
Hypothesis  Ib-The  first-clock  prediction  (b). 
An  industry incumbent’s order of  entry into (I 
rechrtical  subfield,  relutive  to  the  entr?.  of 
all  purticipants,  will  not  be  reluted  to  its 
performance in the subfield. 
Hypothesis 2-  The second-clock prerliclion. 
The  earlier  an  industry  incumbent  ctiters  (I 
techtiicul subfield, relative to other incumbents, 
the better its performance in the subfield. 
Hypothesis  3-The  etitrunt-type prediction. 
Industry  incumbents  that  enter  new  technicul 
subfields  of  the  industry  wiN  tend  to  enjoy 
better  performance  in  the  .subfield  thun  will 
industry newcomers. 
Survivor bias 
As well  as the single-clock confusion.  estimates 
of  entry  order effects may  be  inaccurate  if  the 
sample contains a survivor  bias.  Because  many 
entry  order studies have  drawn  from the Profit 
Impact  of  Market  Strategy  (PIMS)  data  base 
(Robinson and Fornell,  1985; Vanhonacker  and 
Day,  1987;  Robinson,  1988;  Lambkin,  1988; 
Miller,  Gartner,  and  Wilson,  1989), few  firms 
that entered an industry and then quickly exited 
have been included in the samples. In addition, 
at  least  three studies that used  non-PIMS  data 
explicitly excluded nonsurvivors (Bond and Lean, 
1977; Whitten, 1979; Biggadike, 1979). Excluding 
early entrants that quickly exited, often because 
they performed poorly, will cause an upward bias 
in the  measured  link  between  performance  and 
early entry. 
A DUAL-CLOCK STUDY OF ENTRY 
ORDER INFLUENCES 
This paper examines links between  entry timing 
and  performance  in  five  emerging  technical 
subfields  of  the  medical  diagnostic  imaging 
industry.  Because  the  data  include  almost  all 
entrants to one industry,  the study controls for 
several  possible  conflicting  effects.  By  limiting 
the  study  to  one industry  it  avoids  differences 
across industries that may influence the perform- 
ance  of  firms  within  them.  By  including  all 
entrants it  avoids  both  the survivor  bias  and a 
size effect  bias  that  may  occur when  only large 
firms are  included  in  a sample. The study  also 
avoids  the  self-reporting  bias  of  PIMS-based 
studies. In a sample subject to the survivor, large 
firm.  and  self-reporting  biases,  there  will  be  a 
tendency to find mainly firms possessing a strong 
set of  specialized assets.  In such cases, only the 
influence  of  the  second  entry  clock  will  be 
measured. This study, because  it includes almost 
all  entrants  to  one  industry,  measures  the 
influences of  both  clocks. 
Market share and survival measures of 
performance 
Most entry order studies have examined effects 
on market share or profitability performance. In 
addition  to  market  share,  this  paper  examines 
the  link  between  entry  timing  and  length  of 
participation  in the new  subfield,  referred  to  as 
survival. One reason  to examine survival is that 
it  provides  an  alternative  performance  measure 
when  market  share  or  profitability  are  not Entry  Order and Newcomer Market Share  89 
available.  Market  share  and  profitability  often 
are difficult to measure. In the diagnostic imaging 
industry,  for example,  it  has  not  been  possible 
to  measure  profitability  reliably,  owing  to  the 
40-year  length  of  the  analysis  and  the  types of 
participants;  some are privately  held  companies 
that  do not  report public  financial  statements, 
while others are small units within large compa- 
nies.  Survival  sometimes  is  a  more  tractable 
performance  measure. 
Survival,  though,  may  be  only  weakly  corre- 
lated with market share or profitability. Schaffer 
(1989),  for  instance,  argued  that  profit  non- 
maximization may sometimes be associated with 
longer survival. But even as a distinct measure of 
performance, the length of a firm’s participation in 
a market is valuable. Corporate strategists since, 
at least, Barnard (1947) have recognized survival 
as one organizational goal. Survival potential also 
is of interest to a firm’s employees, the community 
in  which  it  is  based,  and  its  competitors. 
The  comparative  investigation  is  particularly 
important  given  the  potential  for  trade-offs 
between market share and survival. 
Imaging industry description and concepts 
The  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century  was 
marked by the development of  important medical 
diagnostic  tools.  The  first  commercial  x-ray 
equipment was available within a year of Roent- 
gen’s  1895 discovery  that  short electromagnetic 
waves  would  produce  fluorescence  in  mineral 
salts. During the first two decades of  the century, 
electrocardiographs  and  encephalographs  were 
also introduced  to medical  markets.  X-ray  and 
electrodiagnostic  techniques  improved  during 
the  next  60  years,  as  better  tubes,  full-wave 
rectification methods that reduced imaging times, 
equipment to focus the radiation, better film, and 
cathode-ray tube monitors appeared  (Hamilton, 
1982). Until  the early  1950s, however,  doctors 
had few ways of seeing inside people. They could 
use  x-ray  equipment  to produce dim  images of 
bones and organs, electrodiagnostic instruments 
to depict  physiological activity, lamps to create 
transluminescent  images  through  the  skin,  or 
scalpels to cut open their patients. 
Beginning  in the early  1950s, several  distinct 
technical  subfields  of  the  imaging  industry 
emerged,  as shown  in Table  1. Each new  type 
of instrument  has  been  a  partial  substitute for 
previous  devices  sold  to  radiologists  and  other 
medical specialists (Emmitt, 1980; McKay, 1983). 
The  first  commercial  nuclear  medical  imaging 
instruments,  rectilinear  scanners  for  producing 
images of  thyroid glands, were introduced  about 
1952. A  prototype  ultrasonic soft  tissue  imager 
was marketed in 1957. The first American hospital 
to  obtain  a  computed  tomographic (CT) brain 
scanner  did  so  in  1973.  The  first  American 
nuclear  magnetic  resonance  imaging  (NMR  or 
MRI) system was put into clinical practice in late 
1980.  Digital  radiographic  equipment  was  first 
shipped during 1981. 
Most  early instruments in each subfield were 
first designed as research prototypes in academic 
laboratories and then  introduced  as commercial 
prototypes by corporate manufacturers. As noted 
in Table 1, over 200 imaging industry newcomers 
and incumbents introduced products  in  the five 
emerging subfields between  1952 and mid-1989. 
Some  were  major  diversified  industrial  corpo- 
rations, such as General Electric, Siemens, and 
Toshiba; others were start-up ventures and small 
specialists. 
With  the  expansion,  the  imaging  industry 
became increasingly global.  Until  the late  1950s 
the U.S. market was served mainly by  American 
manufacturers. During the 1960s and 1970s many 
European  and  Japanese  firms  used  experience 
gained in selling imaging products in their home 
countries to enter the U.S. (American firms, in 
turn, expanded  into foreign  markets during the 
1970s and  1980s.) Thus, some entrants brought 
not  only  their  American  experience  and  repu- 
tations  to the  U.S. industry,  but  their  foreign 
experience as well. 
The imaging instruments all draw from physical 
science and applied engineering, but  use several 
scientific and  technical  knowledge  bases  within 
those  fields.  Conventional  x-ray  instruments 
record the absorption of  short waves of radiation 
after they have passed through the body. Electro- 
diagnostic devices use electrical signals. Nuclear 
medical imaging instruments measure the gamma- 
ray emissions of  radioactive materials that have 
been  administered  to  a  patient.  Ultrasonic 
imagers  produce  pictures  by  interpreting either 
sonic  echoes  from  organs  or  frequency  shifts 
induced  by  moving  objects  such  as fetuses  or 
blood.  CT scanners  record  x-radiation  and  use 
computers  to interpret  the  absorption  patterns. 
Magnetic resonance imaging equipment subjects 
the  body  to  a  large  magnetic  field  and  then 
interprets  changes  in  the  resonance  of  atomic 90  W.  Mitchell 
Table 1. 
and number of  entrants to the U.S. market between  1952 and mid-1989 
Diagnostic imaging industry technical subfields. year of  introduction of  first  commercial prototypes, 
Introduction year  Entrants to U.S. 
market that had 
been  industry 
Non-U.S.  Total entrants to  incumbents before 
markets  U.S. markets  U.S. market  entry to subfield 
Traditional subfields 
Conventional x-ray  1896 
Electrodiagnostic  191 1 
New subfields 
Nuclear medical  c. 1954 
Ultrasonic  c. 1954 
Computed tomographic  1972 
Magnetic resonance  1978 
Digital radiographic  1981 
1896 
191 1 
1952  69  13 
1957  159  38 
1973  31  15 
1980  23  11 
1981  32  21 
314  98 
nuclei when a smaller radio frequency electromag- 
netic  force  disturbs  the  original  field.  Digital 
radiographic equipment, like conventional  x-ray 
and CT, uses x-radiation but stores the absorption 
information digitally for adjustment and interpre- 
tation  (Meschan  and Ott, 1984). Each new class 
of  instrument, therefore, has defined a technical 
subfield-a  technological discontinuity  (Tushman 
and Anderson, 1986) within the imaging industry 
and market. 
Although  the know-how  required  to produce 
the new  core products  has been  new, successful 
commercialization  of  each  new  class of  imaging 
instrument  has  required  specialized  supporting 
assets that already were held by  industry incum- 
bents.  Such  assets  have  included  idiosyncratic 
research,  development and manufacturing facili- 
ties, dedicated  sales and service operations. and 
established  reputations with  existing  customers 
(Drew, 1987). There have been significant incen- 
tives  for industry incumbents  to enter emerging 
subfields and  so realize  the value  of  their  rent- 
producing  assets.  Although  imaging  industry 
incumbents  often  have  delayed  their  entries, to 
allow the uncertainty surrounding early develop- 
ment  of  new  products  to subside  and  to avoid 
cannibalizing existing lines, many eventually have 
begun to manufacture goods in the new technical 
subfields. 
Several  characteristics  make the industry  and 
its subfields suitable for this study. First, imitation 
has been possible. Although reproducing a competi- 
tor’s imaging  instrument  cannot  be compared  to 
building a Heathkit electronics model, many firms 
have had the base of technical competence required 
to understand  and incorporate  imaging advances. 
Therefore,  many  firms  have  been  able  to enter. 
Second, incumbents  usually have  possessed  much 
stronger  sets  of  industry-specialized  supporting 
assets than have newcomers. Third, the entry order 
of  firms  within  the  newcomer  and  incumbent 
classes has varied. Therefore, it has been possible 
to  test  the  hypotheses  concerning  entry  order 
influences on performance. 
To conduct the study it was necessary to define 
the product and geographic scope of the industry, 
identify  analytic  periods, and choose  a level  of 
analysis.  The  paper  has  omitted  component 
suppliers,  treated  the  U.S. market  as  the  geo- 
graphic limit, used calendar years as the measure 
of  participation,  and  dated  entry  as  the  time 
when  a  firm  began  to  manufacture  imaging 
systems. In addition, the analysis was conducted 
at the parent-firm  level  rather than the organi- 
zational  subunit level  of  analysis owing  both  to 
difficulty in assigning subunit level exit dates and 
to  the  presence  of  parent-level  influences  on 
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It also was necessary to support the contention 
that  incumbents  of  the  imaging  industry  that 
entered new  subfields  tended  to possess  strong 
sets of  assets that were  specialized  to  products 
in  the  new  area.  Mitchell  (1988)  showed  that 
imaging  industry  incumbents  were  significantly 
more likely than  industry newcomers to possess 
large  direct  sales  systems  before  entry  to  a 
new technical  subfield. Industry  incumbents, by 
definition,  are  more  likely  to  possess  imaging 
industry experience and  reputations with  users, 
capabilities that imaging industry lore believes to 
be important for success in the industry (Emmitt, 
1980; Drew, 1987; Hess, 1987). Thus the distinc- 
tion  between  incumbents  and  newcomers  is 
appropriate for this study. 
ANALYSIS 
Data 
The sample included 314 manufacturing entrants 
to the  five technical  subfields of  the  diagnostic 
imaging  industry  that emerged  after  1952. This 
represented  about  225  firms,  because  some 
entered  more  than  one  subfield.*  All  firms 
manufactured equipment for the diagnostic medi- 
cal  field;  manufacturers  of  dental,  veterinary, 
chiropractic,  and  therapeutic  equipment  were 
excluded.  The  data  were  gathered  from  an 
extensive archival  search of  academic, industry, 
and  government  sources,  supplemented  by  a 
series of  interviews with  industry  and academic 
participants.  Entrants  were  split  into  the  two 
classes of  newcomers  and  incumbents (216 and 
98  firms)  so  that  differences  in  performance 
means and variances could be estimated for each 
category. 
Variables 
Two  sets of  dependent variables  were  defined: 
market share attained and survival. The average 
market  share within  a  technical  subfield of  the 
imaging industry  attained  during a firm’s first 4 
Because some industry newcomers entered more than one 
subfield,  some  firms  were  classed  as  newcomers  on  their 
entry to one subfield  and  then  as  industry  incumbents  on 
their entry to another. This does not introduce a bias to the 
study,  because  a  firm  had  to  acquire  industry-specialized 
assets in  order to survive its  first  entry and so moved  into 
the incumbent class. 
years  of  participation  in  the  subfield  was  re- 
corded.’  Because  the  year-long  measurement 
period  could  create  a  downward  bias  during 
partial  years of  participation,  the  market  share 
measurement was started with the January of  the 
calendar  year  following  a  firm’s entry, and did 
not  include  a  firm’s final  year  of  participation. 
If  a  firm survived  less than  4 years the  market 
share variable recorded its average share for the 
1-3  years it did participate. To examine survivor 
bias  effects  on  the  first-4-year  market  share 
results, subsets of  the sample were also created, 
in  which  only  firms that  participated  at least  9 
years  were  included.  In  order  to  examine  the 
durability  of  any  market  share advantages,  the 
study also measured a firm’s 1-year market share 
in its 7th and 9th years of  participation. 
Survival  was  defined  as  a  spell  equal to  the 
number  of  years  that  an entrant to a  technical 
subfield  manufactured  imaging  systems,  with  a 
minimum  of  1 year  for  firms  that  entered and 
exited during the same calendar year. If  an exit 
date was not observed during the period of  the 
study  the  record  was  coded  as  being  right- 
censored.  (Almost  all right-censored cases were 
firms still participating at the end of  the study.) 
Event-history  methods,  such as the accelerated 
event-time statistical models of survival used here, 
incorporate the information that an observation is 
censored  and  weight  the  influence  of  the  case 
accordingly.  In this study the ability to use such 
observations  is  crucial,  because  about half  the 
entrants remained  in  the industry at the end of 
the study. 
To test the dual-clock  entry order hypotheses 
two  entry  order covariates  were  created.  One 
measured  an  entrant’s  overall  rank  order  of 
entry, relative to all entrants. Another measured 
an  industry  incumbent’s  rank  order of  entry, 
For  several  reasons  any  claim  to  have  measured  market 
share  is  audacious.  First,  there is  the matter of  defining  a 
market. Most analysts will  define a given market differently; 
sometimes  the  differences  are  major.  (Often  the  most 
successful firms are those that defined a market innovatively.) 
Second, there are several measures of  share. Market share 
may  be  defined as shipments or orders; it  may be units or 
dollars.  In  a  rapidly evolving industry  many  measures will 
diverge.  Third,  individual  firms  record  and  disclose  share 
differently, both in  the definitions and in the time periods- 
for instance, firms have different financial year-ends. There- 
fore,  an  analyst  must  make  assumptions  throughout  the 
market share recording process. Nonetheless, while this study 
may contain point-estimate inaccuracy, the trends and overall 
levels are accurate. 92  W. Mitchell 
relative  to  other  incumbents.  Each  rank  order 
variable  was  transformed  by  its  natural  log, 
progressively reducing the influence of  late entry. 
In place of  rank order, performance influences 
also could have been obtained with measures of 
elapsed time  before  entry, such as the  number 
of  years after a subfield had emerged that a firm 
entered it.  Entry rank  was  chosen  because  the 
primary  rationale  for the predicted influence  on 
performance  is  competitive  rather  than 
technological-the  argument relies on the number 
of  competitors  that  have  staked  out  positions 
in  a  market,  rather  than  whether  technical 
uncertainty has subsided before entry. Although 
both the competitive and technological influences 
are  likely  to  occur,  independent  influences  of 
rank  order  and  elapsed  time  could  not  be 
obtained  because  the  measures  were  highly 
correlated. In addition, the dual clocks can only 
be  defined  for  rank  order  of  entry,  because 
overall  elapsed  time  can  only  be  defined  as  a 
first-clock measurement. 
Two  independent  variables  recorded  order- 
unrelated  measures of  a firm's  imaging industry 
presence. First, a subfield entrant's industry-wide 
market share during the year before its entry to 
a new subfield was recorded. Second, the number 
of years that a firm had produced imaging systems 
or components anywhere in the world before  its 
American entry into a new subfield was recorded 
in  a global experience variable. 
Several independent variables were defined to 
control for other possible  influences. To control 
for  performance-enhancement  created  when  a 
firm entered a subfield by  purchasing a previous 
entrant, an entry by  acquisition dummy variable 
noted such cases. To control for country-specific 
differences  in  performance.  a  dummy  variable 
recorded  whether  an  entrant  was  a  majority- 
owned  American  firm.  To  examine  effects  of 
absolute company size, a corporate sales variable 
recorded an entrant's total sales during the year 
before its entry into an imaging subfield. including 
sales  of  its  parent  if  the  imaging  equipment 
manufacturer  was  part  of  a  larger  corporation. 
To estimate the effects of environmental richness, 
a subfield growth variable  recorded the increase 
in subfield sales during the year following a firm's 
entry as a proportion of  sales during the year of 
entry. Corporate and subfield  sales values were 
deflated by  the 1967 Producer  Price  Index. 
Correlations  between  the  covariates  in  each 
set of entrants are displayed in Table 2. Although 
many variables are related at statistically  signifi- 
cant  levels,  particularly  the  two  rank  order 
variables  in  the  incumbent  data  set,  there  is 
enough  independent  variation  among  them  to 
allow discrete effects to be estimated. 
Statistical methods 
Associations between the covariates and market 
share were  calculated  with  maximum-likelihood 
regression,  while  influences  on  survival  were 
estimated with accelerated event-time regression. 
The conventional maximum-likelihood regression 
method  is  well  known and will  not be described 
here. Because the accelerated event-time model 
is  more  novel  in  organizational  studies,  a  brief 
explanation  will  be introduced. More detail can 
be found in Kalbfleisch and Prentice  (1980) and 
Cox and Oakes (1984).4 
The  principal  advantage  of  the  accelerated 
event-time  method  compared  to  conventional 
regression techniques is that it can include right- 
censored  cases;  that  is,  records  for  which  an 
event  has not  been  observed  during the period 
of  study.  The  weight  of  a  censored  case  is 
incorporated  into  the  estimates  by  using  its 
survival function  values at the time of  censoring 
as its contribution to a likelihood function-that 
is,  the  probability  that  the  event  will  occur  at 
some time  beyond  the observed duration. (The 
survival function equals one minus the cumulative 
density function.) An observed event. meanwhile, 
contributes its probability  density function value 
to the likelihood function, that is, the probability 
that the event occurred at the observed time. If 
those cases were omitted from this study, as they 
would  have  to  be  in  a  conventional  regression 
model,  the  results  would  be  seriously  biased 
(Tuma and Hannan, 1984). 
The  accelerated  event-time  method  assumes 
that  values  of  the  dependent variable,  such  as 
the length of  a firm's participation  in an imaging 
industry subfield, are distributed according to an 
underlying  parametric  distribution.  If  the  only 
influence  on  the  observed  event-time  were  the 
underlying distribution,  the pattern of  observed 
events would  take its shape. If  other influences 
'  The nccclerated  event-time  analyses were carried out  with 
PROC  LIFEREG  of  SAS.  Version  6.03  (SAS  Institute 
Inc., I9XS).  The maximum-likelihood uncensored regression 
estimates  were  ohtained  by  using  the  NOLOG  and  normal 
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Table 2. 
Imaging industry incumbents (n  = 98) 
Product moment correlations between  independent variables 
~~ 
- 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
Overall rank order 
Incumbent rank order 
Growth 
Market share 
Global experience 
American  firm 
Entry by acquisition 
Corporate sales 
I  3  3  4  5  6  7  8 
1.00  0.SY  -0.28  -0.32  -0.06  -0.07  U.29  -0.19 
1.00  -0.30  -0.35  -0.03  -0.13  0.29  -0.19 
1.00  0.02  -0.13  0.14  -0.07  -0.04 
1.00  0.40  0.03  0.09  0.64 
1.00  -0.43  -0.13  0.69 
1.00  0.12  -0.20 
1.00  0.04 
1  .00 
Variable mean  2.95  2.05  6.60  1.63  26.3  0.54  0.18  49.9 
~ 
Correlations greater  than  or equal to 0.17 are 0.05 significant 
Newcomers to the imaging industry (n = 216) 
1  3  5  6  7  8 
1.  Overall rank order  1 .OO  - 
3.  Growth 
5.  Global experience 
6.  American firm 
7.  Entry by  acquisition 
8.  Corporate sales 
Variable mean  3.55 
-0.36 
1  .OO  - 
1.03 
0.07  -0.14  0.25  0.06 
-0.03  0.01  -0.09  -0.03 
1.00  -0.43  -0.11  0.11 
1.00  -0.09  -0.03 
1.00  0.28 
1.00 
1.15  0.74  0.19  7.14 
Correlations greater  than or  equal to 0.12 are 0.05 significant 
apply, however,  the distribution will be acceler- 
ated  or  decelerated  by  the  influence  of  case- 
specific  independent variables,  such  as a  firm’s 
entry  order and  its size.  Log-linear  models  are 
most  often  estimated, so that  the multiplicative 
effect  of  the covariates  appears additive  in log 
form. In general, an accelerated event-time model 
takes the form 
Ln(7) = a  + pX+  we, 
where  Ln(T)  is  a  vector  of  the natural  logs of 
the  observed  event-times,  pX  is  a  matrix  of 
independent variables and associated coefficients, 
and the  error  vector  E  is  distributed  according 
to  the  assumed  parametric  distribution.  The 
distribution  has  intercept  a.  and  is  scaled  by  a 
variance-related parameter u. 
Many underlying distributions can be specified. 
In  practice  it often is useful  to work with either 
the gamma family of parametric  distributions or 
the  loglogistic  distribution.  The  arithmetically 
nested  gamma  distributions  include  the  one- 
parameter exponential,  two-parameter  Weibull, 
two-parameter  lognormal,  and  three-parameter 
generalized  gamma. The four  members  of  the 
family  encompass  a  broad  range  of  empirically 
observed distributions. If  underlying event-times 
are  distributed  linearly,  implying  a  constant 
exit  rate,  the  exponential  distribution  will  be 
appropriate. If exit rates decrease monotonically 
over  time  the  Weibull  may  be  suited.  If  exit 
rates  change  non-monotonically , the  lognormal 
distribution may describe  them. And if  unspeci- 
fied  independent  variables  have  a  significant 
influence, the third parameter of  the generalized 
gamma  will  sometimes  control  for  those  influ- 
ences.  Because  the distributions are nested, one 
can start with  the more complicated generalized 
gamma  and  then  use  significance  tests  of  its 94  W.  Mitchell 
parameters  to  simplify  to  a  lower-level  distri- 
bution. 
The loglogistic distribution, which is not nested 
in the gamma family, provides an alternative to 
the Weibull and lognormal distributions, because 
it can fit either a monotonic or a non-monotonic 
decrease in exit rate. Having fatter tails than the 
Weibull  and lognormal, the  loglogistic provides 
a  better  fit  to cases  where  many  events  occur 
both  early  and  late. Such early  and  late exit is 
common in  organizational  studies. 
Within the gamma family the lognormal distri- 
bution  provided  the  best  fit  to  the data of  this 
study.  Graphical  analysis  of  model  residuals, 
however,  showed  the  loglogistic  distribution  to 
provide  a  still  better  fit.  (Once the  effects  of 
specified covariates have been controlled for, the 
remaining variance in  exit times should take the 
shape  of  the  assumed  parametric  distribution 
of  underlying  times.) The  empirical  loglogistic 
estimates took a non-monotonic form-an  early 
honeymoon  while  firms used  their entry capital 
to override difficulties, followed by  a shake-out, 
followed  by  long  participation  of  those  which 
survived  the shake-out. The model specification 
was not critical in the hypotheses tests, however, 
as robust findings extended  across the  Weibull, 
lognormal, and loglogistic distributions. 
RESULTS 
The  results  of  the  tests  of  the  hypotheses  are 
displayed in  Tables 3. 4, and 5. Table 3 reports 
estimates  of  influences  on  first-4-year  average 
market  share. Table  4  reports  effects  on  long- 
term market share. Table 5 reports influences on 
length of survival. The results are consistent with 
most hypotheses, although the first-clock findings 
with  respect  to  survival  are  opposite  to  those 
predicted, demonstrating the existence of a trade- 
off between  market share and survival. 
The dual-clock predictions 
The estimates of  the  dual-clock effects on first- 
4-year  market  share  and  survival  within  the 
empirical  range  of  entry  rank  are  depicted  in 
Figures 1 and 2. Hypothesis la predicted that an 
industry  newcomer  would  perform  better when 
it  entered a  subfield  early  relative  to all  other 
participants. while Hypothesis  1 b predicted that 
Additive effect 
on market share (%) 
1  Clock 1:  Incumbent 
Clock2 lncumbent 
-20 - 
Clock 1:  Newcomer 
-30 !  1 
0  20  40  60  80 
Rank entry order 
Figure  1.  Dual-clock  effects  on first-4-year average 
market share. 
Multiplicitive effect 
on  survival (years) 
41  Clock  I:  Incumbent 
Clock  1:  Newcomer 
\  Clock 2:  Incumbent 
-It  I 
0  20  40  60  80 
Rank entry order 
Figure 2.  Dual-clock  effects on survival. 
an industry  incumbent’s performance  would  not 
be  related to its overall entry order. Hypothesis 
2  predicted  that  an  incumbent’s  performance 
would  be  inversely  related  to  its  entry  order 
relative to other incumbents. 
Shown in Table 3,  the first-4-year market share 
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Table 3.  Maximum-likelihood estimates of dual-clock 
entry order influences on first-4-year average  market 
share  in  five  technical  subfields  of  the  diagnostic 
imaging industry (standard errors in parentheses) 
Newcomers  Incumbents 
Intercept 
Clock 1: Log overall 
entry rank 
Clock 2:  Log 
incumbent entry 
rank 
growth 
share 
Subfield sales 
Industry market 
Global experience 
American firm 
Entry by  acquisition 
Corporate sales 
($100M) 
Normal distribution 
scale parameter 
Entrants 
Model chi-square 
(d.f.) 
23.49*** 
(3.04) 
(0.662) 
-  5.677*  * * 
-  0.466*  * 
(0.206) 
-0.105 
(0.236) 
0.526 
(1  319) 
4.754** 
(2.014) 
0.010 
(0.033) 
10.54 
(0.51) 
7.058*  * * 
(2.521) 
0.122 
(1.199) 
-2.750* * 
(1.398) 
0.049*** 
(0.0 18) 
2.238*  * * 
(0.424) 
(0.039) 
0.522 
(1.562) 
0.854 
(1.934) 
-0.021 
(0.016) 
6.691 
(0.478) 
-0.003 
216 
67.2(6)*** 
98 
634  8)  * * * 
*p < 0.10,  **p  < 0.05,  **‘  p  < 0.01 (two-tailed tests). 
later a  newcomer entered, the lower its market 
share. For incumbents, lower market share was 
associated with later entry relative only to other 
incumbents,  not overall entry order. 
Long-term market share effects also are found 
for  industry  newcomers.  Shown  in  Table 4,  a 
newcomer’s share was smaller,  even  in  the 7th 
and  9th  years  of  its  participation,  the  later  it 
entered  the  subfield.  For  industry  incumbents 
the  significance  of  the  first-  and  second-clock 
entry  order  effects  in  the  7th  year  also  are 
consistent with those of  the first-4-year average. 
By year 9, however, the dual-clock influences on 
incumbents were reversed. For the 26 incumbents 
that participated for at least 10 years, late entry 
relative to other incumbents was associated with 
higher market share. 
The  long-term  market  share  reversal  for 
incumbents must be interpreted carefully, because 
the net entry order effect of  overall entry order 
plus incumbent entry order is  negative.  Among 
incumbents that survived at least 10 years, overall 
late entry is associated with lower market share. 
On the incumbent  margin,  however, late  entry 
by  incumbents  surviving  at  least  10  years  is 
associated  with  higher  market  share,  a  finding 
that can be best interpreted in the context of  the 
survival results that are reported next. 
The dual-clock effects on survival are reported 
in Table 5. Both first-clock survival measures are 
positive.  Whether it was an industry incumbent 
or a newcomer, the later a firm entered relative 
to other entrants, the longer it  survived.  Thus, 
although late entry may be associated with lower 
market share, it  is  often  associated  with  longer 
participation.  This  result  probably  stems from 
reduced uncertainty as a subfield matures-later 
entrants know more about technical, market, and 
competitive conditions than do  earlier participants 
and so can fit their operations to the conditions. 
Early entrants, therefore, appear to trade poten- 
tial  market share rewards for the risk of  being 
shaken out of  the subfield by unexpected events. 
Notice,  though,  that  incumbents  face  an 
opposing  late  entry  trade-off  between  market 
share  and survival  with  respect  to the  second 
clock.  The later  an  incumbent entered relative 
to other incumbents, the shorter its participation, 
because earlier-entering incumbents were able to 
establish  strong positions  and knock  out  most 
laggards. As was shown in the preceding market 
share analysis, however, if a late-entering incum- 
bent  does manage  to survive,  then  it  may  be 
able to match  successful  technical  and  market 
choices to its specialized assets and excel competi- 
tively. 
The entrant-type prediction 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that, after entry to a new 
subfield,  industry  incumbents  would  perform 
better  than  newcomers.  The prediction  can  be 
tested by examining the intercepts of  the models 
reported  in  Tables  3,  4  and  5. Newcomers’ 
average first-4-year market share, the intercept of 
Table 3,  significantly exceeds that of  incumbents. 
This  result  is  due  to  the  high  incidence  of 
newcomer  entry  early  in  the  history  of  each 
subfield. When there were few participants, and 
consequently  few  firms  to  divide  share,  most 
participants were industry newcomers. Shown in 
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Table  4. 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Maximum-likelihood  estimates  of  dual-clock  entry  order  influences  on  long-term  market  share 
Year  7 market  share  Year 9 market  share 
Newcomers  Incumbents  Newcomers  Incumbents 
Intercept 
Clock  1: Log overall entry rank 
Clock 2:  Log incumbent entry  rank 
Subfield sales growth 
Industry market  share 
Global experience 
American  firm 
Entry  by acquisition 
Corporate sales 
Normal distribution  scale parameter 
Entrants 
Model chi-square (d.f.) 
15,88:k.%Z 
(4.39) 
(I .024) 
-0.287 
(0.  192) 
-  j  ,  445  :k -i  i< 
0.146 
(0.268) 
3.623 
(2.442) 
6.847*" 
(7.629) 
0.008 
(0.038) 
8.607 
(0.7  12) 
73 
23.6(6)" '  * 
7.631 
-  1.222 
-  2.573 t 
(1.980) 
0.038 
2.08"  *  I 
(0.648) 
0.01  1 
(0,086) 
2.745 
(3.035) 
0.374 
(3.749) 
0.018 
(0.031) 
8.529 
(4.780) 
(1.993) 
(0.034) 
(0.899) 
11.36"* 
(4.63) 
-3,17g*  6  6 
(1,103) 
-0.201 
(0.159) 
0.067 
(0.235) 
2.562 
(2.596) 
7.218"' 
(3.517) 
(0.095) 
6.651 
(0.744) 
-0.066 
22.46*  * * 
-9.864*** 
(2.303) 
5.022*  * * 
(1.763) 
1.196* 
(0.715) 
2.705*  * * 
(5.35) 
(0.622) 
-0.044 
(0.065) 
0.994 
(2.036) 
-0.563 
(2.924) 
0.020 
(0.023) 
4.009 
(0.556) 
45 
43.2( 8)  * .* * 
40 
11.0(6)" 
26 
52.2(8)  * * * 
*p  < 0.10, 
Year  7 and 9 market shares were  included  only for firms that  survived  at least 8 and  10 years 
**p < 0.05.  *'*p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests). ip < 0.10 (one-tailed test). 
through year 7, but had reversed by year 9. Like 
the long-term  market share results, the survival 
analysis intercepts shown in Table 5 also display 
an  incumbent  advantage.  All  differences  are 
statistically significant when treated as difference 
between  means from populations with different 
variances.  Thus,  incumbents of  the  diagnostic 
imaging industry have had both long-term market 
share  and  survival  advantages  over  industry 
newcomers, irrespective of  entry order influences. 
Other influences 
Tables 3, 4  and 5  also report the influences on 
performance  of  subfield  sales  growth,  prior 
industry market share, global experience, Amer- 
ican  majority  ownership, entry  by  acquisition, 
and corporate sales. Subfield sales growth during 
the year following entry is  negatively associated 
with newcomer 4-year market share and positively 
associated with  incumbent 4-year  market share, 
but has weaker association with long-term market 
share and survival.  A  firm's prior market share 
in  the industry is  associated with  higher market 
share in  the new  subfield, but  not with  longer 
survival  net  of  entry  order  effects.  Global 
experience does not lead to greater market share, 
but  does  provide  industry  incumbents  with 
survival  advantages.  American  firms  have  a 
positive but non-significant market share advan- 
tage,  but  a  survival  disadvantage compared  to 
their foreign competitors. Entry by acquisition is 
associated with greater newcomer market share. 
but has no significant effect on incumbent market 
share or either survival measure. Corporate sales 
influence  neither  market  share  nor  survival, 
indicating that samples containing firm-size biases 
may provide reasonable performance estimates. Entry  Order and  Newcomer Market Share  97 
Table  5.  Accelerated  event-time estimates  of  dual- 
clock entry order influences on length of  participation 
in  five  technical  subfields of  the  diagnostic  imaging 
industry (standard errors in parentheses) 
Table 6.  Maximum-likelihood estimates of dual-clock 
entry  order influence  on  first-4-year average  market 
share when there is a survivor bias: only firms surviving 
at least 9 years (standard errors in parentheses) 
Newcomers  Incumbents  Newcomers  Incumbents 
Intercept 
Clock 1: Log overall 
entry rank 
Clock 2:  Log 
incumbent entry 
rank 
growth 
share 
Subfield sales 
Industry market 
Global experience 
American firm 
Entry by  acquisition 
Corporate sales 
($100M) 
Log  logistic 
distribution scale 
parameter 
Entrants  (exiters) 
Model chi-square 
(d.f.) 
1.507*  * * 
(0.318) 
0.207*  * * 
(0.070) 
0.046 
(0.030) 
0.003 
(0.027) 
-0.194 
(0.202) 
-0.312 
(0.2  10) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.568 
(0.043) 
216 (118) 
14.0 (6)** 
2.239*** 
(0.39  1) 
0.649*** 
(0.189) 
(0.234) 
0.001 
0.061 
(0.078) 
0.018* 
-0.749* * * 
-0.919*** 
(0.002) 
(0.0 10) 
(0.257) 
0.031 
(0.248) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.456 
(0.058) 
Intercept 
Clock 1: Log overall 
entry rank 
Clock 2: Log 
incumbent entry 
rank 
growth 
share 
Subfield sales 
Industry market 
Global experience 
American  firm 
Entry by  acquisition 
Corporate sales 
($100M) 
Normal distribution 
scale parameter 
29.55  * * * 
(5.34) 
-  7.988  * * * 
(1.230) 
-0.624*** 
(0.202) 
0.101 
(0.283) 
3.281 
(2.987) 
8.715*** 
(3.118) 
0.022 
(0.040) 
8.790 
(0.8  16) 
17.39*** 
(3.50) 
(1.712) 
1.748 
(1.761) 
0.011 
(0.022) 
4.332*** 
(0.572) 
(0.058) 
(2.244) 
3.042 
(2.495) 
-4.987*** 
-0.016 
-4.946* * 
-0.076* * * 
(0.022) 
5.319 
(0.627) 
98 (43) 
57.0 (8)*** 
Entrants  70  36 
Model chi-square  36.8(6)*  * :*  48.2(8)*  * * 
(d.f.) 
*p < 0.10,  **p < 0.05,  ***p < 0.01  (two-tailed test\). 
Survivor bias effects 
Although firm-size biases may not be important, 
Table 6 demonstrates that using data containing 
a  survivor bias  may lead to biased  estimates of 
entry order influences on performance. The table 
reports the market share results obtained when 
only  firms  that  survived  at  least  9  years  were 
included  in  the  sample.  The  negative  clock  1 
influence on  newcomers continues to hold.  The 
incumbent  clock  1  and  clock  2  influences, 
however,  are reversed  from those found in  the 
unbiased  sample  of  Table  3, with  the  biased 
first-clock negative  association being statistically 
significant. 
*p  < 0.10,  **p  < 0.05.  ***p  < 0.01 (two-tailed tests) 
DISCUSSION  AND CONCLUSION 
The  core  hypotheses  of  this  paper  have  been 
supported, clarifying our understanding of  entry 
order  effects.  Including  all  entrants  and  con- 
trolling for dual entry order influences, the study 
finds  that  industry  newcomers  and  industry 
incumbents have been subject to different entry 
timing clocks when entering new subfields of  the 
diagnostic  imaging  industry.  Whether perform- 
ance  is  measured  as  market  share  attained  or 
length of  participation in the subfield, newcomers 
are subject to the influence of  their entry order 
relative to all entrants, while industry incumbents 
mainly are affected by  other incumbents. 
The first-clock results are consistent with those 
found  in  single-industry  studies  in  which  only 98  W.  Mitchell 
one clock  would  be  likely to  matter. Bond and 
Lean’s (1977) study of  pharmaceuticals and  the 
Project  Sappho  study  of  chemical  processes 
(Freeman, 1982). for instance, found early entry 
advantages in industries in which innovations are 
difficult to  imitate  because  of  patent  protection 
or tacit know-how. Early entrants, in such cases, 
will  be difficult to overtake. 
The  significant  second-clock  effects  help  us 
understand  why  studies containing survivor and 
multiple  industry  biases  have  produced  mixed 
conclusions.  The  dual-clock  results  also  help 
clarify the results of  studies in which imitation is 
relatively  easy,  such  as  analytic  instruments 
(Freeman, 1982). semiconductors  (Spital, 1983), 
and ultrasound instruments (Friar, 1986). In such 
cases the early entry advantage has been weaker, 
when measured on only one clock, partly because 
late  entrants  could  replicate,  improve,  and 
commercialize the innovations.  Instead,  finding 
early  entry  advantages  would  depend on  iden- 
tifying specialized supporting assets and recording 
entry on an appropriate second clock. 
In  addition, the  study  identifies  entry  order 
trade-offs for market share and survival perform- 
ance. Early entrants are likely to attain greater 
initial  market  share. They  also tend  to acquire 
greater long-term market share, but only if they 
survive.  Late entrants, meanwhile,  often  enjoy 
longer lives in  the new subfield. 
Doubtless, the reported  results do not  record 
all  influences  on  performance.  The  scale  and 
intensity  of  a  firm’s  entry,  the  quality  of  its 
products,  whether  it  acquires other  firms  after 
entry. and the general competence of  its manage- 
ment  will  affect  its  market  share  and  survival. 
Nonetheless,  the  entry  timing  influences  are 
significant  and  robust.  For  instance,  analysis 
conducted  at  the  subunit level,  rather than  the 
parent-firm  level  of  analysis,  produced  qualita- 
tively equivalent  results.5 
The analysis is consistent with many theoretical 
and  empirical  studies  which  have  found  that 
industry  newcomers  tend  to  be  the  introducers 
of  new  products.  Unlike  some  predictions, 
’  In the market share analysis. subunit level analysis reduced 
the  number  of  entries.  but  did  not  eliminate  the  late 
entry-lower  market  share  effect.  For  analysis  of  survival. 
although participants tended to survive longer at the subunit 
than  iit  the  parent  lcvel  of  analysis, there  was  little  or no 
participmt-typc hiah. 
however,  this  did  not  lead  to  a  turnover  of 
leading firms (Reinganum, 1983). Although rarely 
first  entrants,  industry  incumbents  tended  to 
dominate  the  new  technical  subfields  of  the 
diagnostic  imaging  industry.  Reinganum’s  argu- 
ment, however, assumes non-imitable innovations 
and  does not  encompass  value  associated  with 
supporting  assets.  Because  imaging  industry 
product  innovations  could  be  replicated,  late- 
entering incumbents could  use  their  specialized 
capabilities to dominate. 
Unlike  Reinganum’s  (1983,  1985)  prediction 
that  incumbents  will  invest  less  than  industry 
newcomers  because  an  incumbent’s  incentive  is 
reduced  by  its  existing  rent  stream,  imaging 
industry incumbents often have invested far more 
(Abell,  1980;  Hess,  1987).  This  is  partially 
consistent  with  Conner’s (1988)  prediction  that 
incumbents would  invest more in  order to finish 
product  development  first  and  so  protect  their 
existing  rent  stream,  but  would  shelve  the 
new  product  until  competitive  entry  occurred. 
Although  investing more, however,  rarely have 
late-entering diagnostic imaging industry incum- 
bents  completed  product  development  before 
early-entering  newcomers,  as  Conner’s  model 
predicted.  Instead, incumbents  appear to have 
invested  more  in order to catch  up, which  will 
be  possible  when  early  products  are  imitable, 
and because their possession of supporting assets 
made  higher  market  share and  longer  survival 
likely once they introduced the new products and 
so provided  greater incentive to invest. 
The results do not apply to every industry. In 
industries  that possess different combinations of 
Lieberman and Montgomery’s (1988) first-mover 
advantages  and  disadvantages,  the  newcomer- 
incumbent classification might not be appropriate 
for  a  multiple-clock  study.  When  first products 
are non-imitable,  then  entry order analysis will 
collapse  to  a  study  of  first-mover  advantages. 
When specialized assets do not retain their value 
from  one generation  to  the  next,  and perhaps 
acquire  negative  value  because  of  incumbent 
inertia,  then  different classifications would have 
to be used. 
But  the conditions of  this study are common 
enough for the results to have important impli- 
cations. Technical and market development often 
is  uncertain.  Many  new  products  are imitable. 
Incumbents  frequently  possess  broad  sets  of 
specialized  supporting  assets  that  cannot  be replicated  immediately; and some industry new- 
comers have the potential to replicate the assets. 
The implications for strategic decision-making 
are  striking.  Newcomers  face  a  market 
share-survival  trade-off.  When a  new  technical 
subfield  emerges, a  newcomer  to  the  industry 
will  be  more  likely  to  gain  market  share  if  it 
enters early, but will be more likely  to survive if 
it enters late. An  industry incumbent, meanwhile, 
will  perform  better if  it  waits while  newcomers 
test  the  products  and  markets.  Once  other 
incumbents have begun to enter, the incumbent 
entry clock  will  begin  to tick.  Incumbents will 
have to watch that second clock. Many of  those 
that do not  watch  the clock  will  be frozen  out 
or,  if  they  do enter  late,  knocked  out of  the 
market. 
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